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The Congressional Divide Over
TANF Reauthorization*
Liz Schott
In 1996, welfare “as we knew it” was replaced with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant.  TANF eliminated both
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and the
entitlement to cash assistance, and imposed a five-year time limit on federal
aid.  TANF funding came in the way of a block grant to each state, which
provided fixed federal funding and enormous discretion to states.  On
September 30, 2002, TANF expired, but Congress twice has temporarily ex-
tended funding in order to provide ongoing federal aid.  Congress must now
take additional action to extend TANF beyond March 2003.
TANF reauthorization could have provided an opportunity for Congress
to expand and improve the 1996 welfare law.  Until this year, both critics and
supporters of the legislation were suggesting relatively modest changes, and
the consensus was that TANF would be reauthorized with only a few modifi-
cations.  However, TANF reauthorization fell victim to partisan politics and
ideological differences and Congress has still been unable to reach an agree-
ment on substantive legislative changes.  TANF reauthorization was not the
only piece of important legislation at a stalemate in Congress this year.  For
example, Homeland Security and Medicare drug benefit proposals were also
at an impasse.  The stalemate over TANF, however, seems particularly
unnecessary in light of the initial degree of consensus about the central
issues surrounding TANF reauthorization.  As one national welfare expert
*At the time this article was finalized for press, the primary TANF reauthorization bills
discussed in this article were still pending  and the 107th Congress was expected to act on
welfare reform during the lame duck session in November 2002.  By the time this
article is read, the bills discussed here will no longer be pending, although they may be
re-introduced in the 108th Congress since Congress did not reauthorize TANF.
Therefore, discussion of the bills that were pending in the 2002 Congressional session is
generally in the past tense in this article.
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commented, “the fundamental story of TANF reauthorization this year is
manufactured controversy.”1
This article examines why Congress has not yet been able to reauthorize
welfare reform.  It focuses on central differences between the House and Sen-
ate bills, as well as the larger aims of various welfare reform agendas brought
to the TANF reauthorization debate by both liberals and conservatives.
ANTICIPATION:  WHAT THE UPCOMING TANF REAUTHORIZATION
DEBATE LOOKED LIKE A YEAR AGO
As the 2002 reauthorization of the TANF block grant approached, the key
issues appeared to be the level of funding, the extent of the emphasis on
marriage promotion, and some modifications on how to measure state
performance.  National welfare advocacy groups, researchers, and states
generally agreed that the key issues were maintaining (and increasing) both
funding and state flexibility.  Liberals focused on increasing state flexibility
with respect to work activities.  Flexibility would give states the ability to
allow education and training to help recipients obtain better jobs, as well as
provide a broader range of services to those with significant barriers to
employment.  Liberals also supported shifting performance measures from
caseload reduction to poverty reduction, and allowing states the flexibility to
serve recent legal immigrants.  Conservative proposals were focused pri-
marily on promoting marriage, but also included controlling costs and
increasing work requirements.  While promoting marriage was one of the
stated purposes of the 1996 law, conservatives argued that generally states
had not prioritized marriage promotion.  Although liberals and conserva-
tives focused on different issues, neither was suggesting a wholesale rewrite
of the 1996 law.  It seemed that an acceptable reauthorization package could
emerge from Congress that would provide something for each side.
All this changed in February 2002 when the Bush Administration released
its version of a reauthorization proposal and the debate shifted to details on
welfare work requirements.2  The Bush proposal maintained fixed block grant
funding, without any increase to compensate for inflation, and redirected $300
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million annually to “promote healthy marriages.”3  The centerpiece of the
Administration’s proposal, and at the center of the Congressional impasse,
was a proposal to dramatically increase work requirements and limit state
flexibility.4  While arguing that welfare reform was successful,5 the Admin-
istration simultaneously criticized state performance in getting recipients to
work and sought to curtail the degree of flexibility available to states.  The
Bush Administration’s approach was at odds with its own claims of the
success of welfare reform and its traditional preferences for state flexibility
over federal mandates.  This approach shifted the debate from proposals on
how to improve TANF in order to help families leave poverty to rhetoric on
which party is tougher on work.
Specifically, the Bush Administration’s proposal sought to curtail state
flexibility by increasing the number of hours that TANF recipients who re-
ceive cash assistance must work and limiting the types of activities that would
count toward meeting the work requirements.6  These new requirements would
have limited states’ ability to provide education and training, as well as the
states’ ability to address barriers to employment that confront many
families.  The Administration’s proposal would have required that states dis-
mantle effective programs in order to meet the new restrictive specifications.
In May 2002, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4737, which
essentially adopted the Bush Administration’s proposal.  Soon afterwards,
the Senate Finance Committee approved a tri-partisan bill, which reflected
many of the recommendations of states, researchers, and advocacy groups.7
One of the most significant differences between the two bills was the type
and extent of work activities required of welfare recipients.
CENTRAL DIFFERENCES ARE ON TANF WORK REQUIREMENTS8
Currently, the TANF block grant requires states to meet certain work
participation rates or face a fiscal penalty.  States are penalized unless 50%
of families are participating in at least 30 hours of “countable” work activi-
ties per week (20 hours per week for a single parent with a child under six
years of age).  See Table 1.  However, this 50% work rate can be reduced
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through a “caseload reduction credit” based on a state’s caseload decline
under TANF.9
The House bill and the Senate Finance bill both proposed changes in this
work requirement.  Both raised the participation rate from the current 50%
to 70% by the year 2007.  The bills differed, however, on the number of
hours of work required.  The House bill required 40 hours per week of work
participation, while the Senate Finance bill sought to maintain the current
law which requires 30 hours per week of work participation (20 hours per
week for single parents with a child under age six).  Both bills required that
at least 24 of these hours involve the more restrictive list of primary activi-
ties.  See Table 1.
One of the central differences between the bills concerned what types of
activities would count toward the 24-hour primary work requirement con-
tained in each bill.  (In both bills, a broader range of activities qualify after
the 24 hours of primary activities are met.)  While work—unsubsidized or
subsidized employment, or unpaid workfare—would count toward the
24-hour requirement under each bill, the House bill imposed strict limits on
what other activities could qualify as primary activities.  Under the House
bill, education, training, job search, or barrier-removal activities combined
would have counted as primary activities for only three months within a total
24-month period.  (In some cases, education can count for four months.)
Beyond the three-month window, these activities would have only counted
to meet the remaining 16-hour requirement.  The House bill was more
restrictive than current law limits on education and training.
In contrast, the Senate Finance bill expanded the definition of “primary
work activities” beyond the current law to extend vocational education (in-
creased from 12 to 24 months) and job search (increased from six to eight
weeks), and to add rehabilitative activities (for up to six months: three months
plus an additional three months when combined with work activities).  For
example, under the Senate Finance Committee approach, an individual could
participate in the following sequence of primary activities: three months of
rehabilitative services, 24 months of vocational training, and two months of
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job search.  The House bill only allowed any, or all, of these activities
combined, to count for three months in a 24-month period.
Another difference between the House bill and Senate Finance bill was
the determination of how states will be rewarded with a credit to reduce work
participation rates.  The House bill retained a caseload reduction credit, but
limited the credit to more recent caseload declines to continue to pressure
states to reduce their TANF caseloads. (This issue is one of the few changes
from the Administration’s proposal.  The Bush plan eliminated the caseload
reduction credit and replaced it with an employment credit.)  The Senate
Finance bill eliminated the caseload reduction credit and replaced it with a
capped employment credit, which would have allowed states to reduce work
rates based on the number of families employed after leaving welfare, with a
larger credit provided when families achieve higher earnings.
Although the details of the work rates appeared to be the main issue of
contention, there were significant other differences between the two bills.
See Table 2.  While both bills proposed to maintain level TANF block grant
funding, the Senate bill provided a greater, although still insufficient increase
in childcare funds.  In addition, the Senate bill would have allowed states
new options to provide benefits to recent legal immigrants, while the House
bill retained the immigrant restrictions present in the current law.  Both bills
included substantial funds to promote marriage.  The House bill, however,
focused the funding solely on marriage promotion, while the Senate Finance
bill focused funding on healthy families including healthy marriages.
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DIFFERENCES
At first glance, the differences in these two bills may not seem drastic
enough to support the gridlock that emerged inside the Beltway.  Both bills
required 70% work rates and 24 hours in primary activities.  Both bills
provided for frozen TANF funding with inadequate childcare funding in-
creases.  Both bills dedicated substantial additional funding to promoting
healthy families and marriage.  Finally, neither bill softened time limits or
the elimination of benefit entitlement—two hallmarks of the 1996 law.
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A closer examination, however, reveals how the bills could have led to
sharply divergent state approaches. The way in which work participation is
measured is likely to shape the approaches of state or local TANF programs
on work preparation activities, and these approaches, in turn, can affect
long-term employment and wage outcomes for low-income families.
Under the House bill, with limits on primary activities and the 40-hour
work requirement, families would have had limited access to education,
training or barrier-removal activities as their primary work activity.  Pres-
sure to meet work rates would have likely driven (as intended) states to run
massive unpaid “workfare” programs for all families not obtaining employ-
ment.10  The House bill would have also provided states with tremendous
incentive to reduce caseloads without regard to the employment status or
circumstances of the families no longer receiving welfare.
The Senate Finance bill would have given states greater incentives to
focus their programs toward poverty reduction.  The Senate Finance bill
provided states a greater flexibility to allow recipients to participate in
education, training, and barrier-removal activities.  Replacing the caseload
reduction credit with an employment credit would effectively shift the focus
from caseload reduction to poverty reduction by rewarding states when
employed families leave welfare, as well as increasing states rewards for
increased family earnings.
Notably, nothing in the Senate Finance bill barred a state from designing
a program with the requirements and limitations enumerated in the House
bill.  If it so chooses, any state can limit access to education or barrier-
removal services, or require 40 hours per week of work activity.  The Senate
Finance bill gave states choices, while the House bill limited state discretion
in designing a welfare-to-work approach.
POLICY AND IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES REFLECTED IN THE BILLS
In some respects, the differences between these two bills reflect tradi-
tional policy and ideological differences between liberal and conservative
analyses of the underlying causes of poverty and the appropriate responses
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to it.  In other respects, just the opposite is true.  With respect to welfare,
conservatives and liberals typically disagree over the causes of poverty and
appropriate responses to address it.  In addition, liberals and conservatives
typically differ about the amount of flexibility that should be afforded to
states in administering federal funds.  Conservatives generally prefer to
give power to states, while liberals prefer a strong federal role in social
safety-net programs.
Causes of Poverty
Differing views on the causes of poverty are reflected in the two bills’
approaches.  The conservative view is that “behavior problems and moral
failings lie at the heart of the underclass,” and that welfare policy should
focus on the goals of marriage, work, religion, and the development of
virtue.11  Robert Rector, of the conservative Heritage Foundation, argues that,
“out-of-wedlock childbearing and single parenthood are the principal causes
of child poverty and welfare dependence in the U.S.”12  Moreover, conserva-
tives label welfare dependency as a key problem, essentially claiming that
welfare causes poverty.13  Thus, to conservatives, marriage promotion and
welfare caseload decline are important issues, and are reflected in the House
bill.  In addition, work preparation is largely framed as a task of improving
behavior with strict work mandates rather than providing training or services.
The House bill emphasizes paid and unpaid work and gives little flexibility
for education and training or skills development.  Conservatives typically
criticize the “permissive entitlement” philosophy that views “low-income
persons as victims of social injustice.”14
Indeed, liberals see low-income persons as victims of social injustice.  They
have traditionally “believed that social problems arise from flaws in societal
institutions (i.e., labor markets, barriers to health care) not from flawed
individuals or overly permissive social programs . . .”15  Thus, liberal responses
have tended to focus on providing assistance in terms of benefits and
services, and addressing labor market barriers through increased skills, rather
than attempting to change behavior.
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State Flexibility
Typical ideological differences between liberals and conservatives do not
comport with the different approaches of the proposed bills that are taken to
balance state flexibility with federal mandates.  In the 1996 welfare law, con-
servatives argued for state flexibility and pushed welfare program design to
the state level.  Fearing harsh state actions under welfare reform, liberals
argued for a federal welfare safety net and increased federal protections.
In the current reauthorization debate, however, the positions on federal-
ism have flip-flopped from those held by each side in the 1996 welfare law
debate.  In 1996, proponents of the TANF block grant strongly argued for
state flexibility, while welfare advocacy groups strongly argued for main-
taining federal directives.  Now, conservatives seek to impose detailed
federal mandates and limit state flexibility, while liberals are defending state
performance and seeking to maintain and expand state flexibility.
These anomalous positions on federal control and state flexibility arise,
in part, because each side has pragmatically focused on the likely policy
result of each scenario.  Progressives embrace expanded state flexibility,
believing that the welfare debates in the states tend to be “less ideological
and more pragmatic, and . . . as caseloads have fallen and more people have
gone to work, the discussions were less divisive and more focused on what
could be done better in the next stage.”16  Acknowledging that state flexi-
bility is often cited as a conservative principle, Robert Rector argues that
state welfare institutions are “more corrupted than federal programs” with
an ethos of permissive entitlement.17  He argues that state flexibility in TANF
reauthorization may conflict with furthering a conservative agenda and
“should never be allowed to trump the basic [welfare reform] principles of
marriage, work, faith, character, and cost control.”18
POLITICS, NOT POLICY, LED TO THE IMPASSE
Despite specific differences between the two bills, and the ideological dif-
ferences they reflect, the underlying cause of the current impasse is the Bush
Administration’s insertion of the “who is tougher on work” rhetoric, and the
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perceived political advantages of framing the debate in those terms.  The Bush
proposal unexpectedly shifted the focus of the TANF reauthorization from a
discussion of which modifications could improve outcomes for families to a
debate about which political party is “tougher on work.”  According to Mark
Greenberg, a leading welfare policy expert of the Center on Law and Social
Policy, given the initial degree of consensus around the central issues
surrounding TANF reauthorization, the Administration’s proposal “created
divisive issues that were not there and did not need to be there.”19
Greenberg commented that:
Had anyone other than the administration proposed a plan like this,
it would have been dismissed out of hand.  There have been many
criticisms of state performance over the past five years, but two things
seemed incontestable: Welfare caseloads had fallen beyond anyone’s
predictions and there had been a historically unprecedented increase
in work among single-parent families. . . . [N]o one was suggesting
that states had not been serious about requiring work.20
Greenberg concluded that liberals and moderates would never succeed in
appearing tougher on work than conservatives, but the Senate approach is
the better choice if the debate is framed around which approach would help
people get jobs at which they can make ends meet.21
Partisan politics in an election year may not have been the sole or primary
motivation in the design of the Bush Administration’s proposal on TANF
reauthorization, but politics took over once the proposal was put forward.
Being “tough on work” and punishing welfare recipients for not working has
long been viewed as an easy way to score political points; many in Washing-
ton were not going to pass up the chance to do so once it presented itself.
Moreover, the Administration may have preferred a stalemate, creating an
opportunity to revisit TANF reauthorization next year with the possibility of
a Republican-controlled Senate.
The National Governors Association and the American Association of
Public Human Services Agencies attempted to refocus the debate on the con-
tent of the Bush proposal and the impact it would have on successful work
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programs.22  However, this attempt had little impact on the debate, and the
paradigm continued to focus on who could demonstrate that they were
“tougher on work.”  While the Senate Finance bill responded to this para-
digm (for example, by matching the House bill in raising the work rates to
70% and requiring 24 hours weekly in primary work activities) the Admin-
istration and conservatives blasted the Senate Finance bill, suggesting a
one-year extension would be better than a “bad bill.”23
MISSED OPPORTUNITY AT A CRUCIAL TIME
TANF reauthorization provided an opportunity to better serve low-income
families and to assist families leaving welfare for work to also escape
poverty.  Passing an extension that merely provides a static continuation of
TANF is a setback.  Funding has been frozen for six years, and additional
funding is needed to keep pace with inflation and the tremendous growth in
childcare needs due to more low-income single mothers entering the
workforce.  Moreover, over the last year, the uncertainty of potential changes
under reauthorization has already served as a brake on program improve-
ments, and additional delay is likely to further deter innovation.
While many people have proclaimed welfare reform’s success over the
last five years, others have cautioned that the real test will occur when
families begin reaching the five-year time limit, when there is an economic
downturn, or when state budgets come under greater financial pressure.  All
three of these things are occurring now.  Program modifications to respond
to these circumstances are crucial, yet the uncertainties around reauthoriza-
tion present powerful inertia against change.  It is time to heed the lessons
learned by research and experience.  It is time to implement changes to assist
low-wage workers not on welfare, and to address the needs of families with
barriers to employment who are facing welfare time limits.  Congress’
failure to reach a timely bipartisan agreement reauthorizing the TANF
represents a missed opportunity to strengthen welfare reform as it faces some
of its biggest challenges.
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Table 1
Summary Comparison of Key TANF Reauthorization Bill Provisions
Work Current House Bill Senate
Requirements Law (H.R. 4737) Finance Bill
Work participation 50% (all families) 70% for all families 70% for all families
rate plus 90% (no separate 2- (no separate 2-
(2-parent families) parent family rate) parent family rate)
Number of hours 30 hours (20 hours 40 hours 30 hours (20 hours
required weekly for single-parent for single-parent
in work activities with child under with child under
(total) age 6) age 6)
Number of hours in 20 hours 24 hours 24 hours
primary activities
Countable primary Primary activities Limits primary Expands current
work activities include paid and activities to paid primary activities
unpaid work, and unpaid work, to also include
vocational education supervised work education for up to
training up to 12 experience and 24 months, job
months, job search community service. search for up to
up to 6 weeks a year, Allows vocational 8 weeks a year,
unpaid work education training, certain barrier-
experience and job search and removal activities
community service. barrier-removal for up to 6 months.
activities to count
for 3 months in a
24-month period.
Credits to reduce Caseload reduction Caseload reduction Capped  employment
required work rate credit reduces credit reduces credit reduces work
required work rate by required work rate by rate based on
extent of caseload extent of caseload employment rate
reduction under TANF reduction for prior after leaving welfare
since 1995. three years. with more credit
for higher family
earnings.
Sanctions States must sanction States must impose States must sanction
families that do not full-family sanction families that do not
participate in work; on families that do participate in work;
may use partial or not participate may use partial or
full-family sanction. in work. full-family sanction.
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1 Telephone Interview with Mark Greenberg, Center on Law and Social Policy (Aug. 19,
2002) (notes on file with the author).
2 WORKING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 15 (Feb. 26, 2002) (the President’s plan to strengthen
welfare reform), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/.
3 Id. at 19–20.
4 Id. at 16–17.
5 Id. at 5–11.
6 Id. at 16–17.
7 For example, recommendations to expand the role of education and training, increase
services for the hard-to-employ, enhance state flexibility to reward work and benefit
children and to set reasonable participation standards are among those made by Man-
power Demonstration Research Corporation, a leading welfare research organization.  See
GORDON L. BERLIN, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., WHAT WORKS IN WELFARE
REFORM: EVIDENCE AND EARLY LESSONS TO GUIDE TANF REAUTHORIZATION (June 2002),
available at http://www.mdrc.org/Reports2002/TANF/TANFGuide_Full.pdf.  The recom-
mendations in this report are based upon findings from 29 separate welfare reform evalu-
ations involving about 150,000 people in 11 states and two Canadian provinces.
Table 2
Summary Comparison of Key TANF Reauthorization Bill Provisions
Other Current House Bill Senate
Provisions Law (H.R. 4737) Finance Bill
Block grant funding $16.5 billion per year $16.5 billion per year $16.5 billion per year
Child care funding For 2002, $2.7 billion Increases mandatory Additional $5.5 billion
mandatory and $2.1 funds by $1 billion mandatory funds
billion discretionary over 5 years; over 5 years; main-
funds authorized increases discre- tains discretionary
tionary funds by funds (if Congress
$2.4 billion over 5 authorizes)
years (if authorized)
Immigrants States may not States may not State option to
provide TANF, provide TANF, provide TANF-funded
Medicaid or SCHIP Medicaid or SCHIP benefits to legal
benefits to most benefits to most immigrants and
legal immigrants legal immigrants Medicaid/SCHIP
during first five during first five benefits to pregnant
years in U.S.  State years in U.S.  State women and children
option to provide option to provide who are legal immi-
benefits after 5 years. benefits after 5 years. grants regardless of
date of entry.
Marriage and States may use TANF Earmarks up to $1.5 Provides $1 billion
family formation funds to prevent billion over five years over five years to
(additional funding out-of-wedlock including $500 in promote stronger
for abstinence births and to promote state or TANF funds) families with an
education in all bills two-parent families. (to promote healthy emphasis on healthy
not addressed here) marriage. marriages.
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8 For more detailed analyses and differing perspectives on these two bills, see SHAWN
FREMSTAD ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ONE STEP FORWARD OR TWO STEPS
BACK?  WHY THE BIPARTISAN SENATE FINANCE BILL REFLECTS A BETTER APPROACH TO TANF
REAUTHORIZATION THAN THE HOUSE BILL (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.clasp.org/
DMS/Documents/1028928846.02/doc_13reasons.pdf; ROBERT RECTOR, HERITAGE FOUND.,
THE BAUCUS “WORK” ACT OF 2002: REPEALING WELFARE REFORM (Sept. 3, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/.
9 See HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, TANF WORK
PARTICIPATION RATES FOR FY 2000, available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opre/
particip/im00rate/table1a.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2001).  Since caseloads have de-
clined significantly in all states, state participation requirements are often wiped out or
greatly reduced when adjusted by this “caseload reduction credit.” Id. For FY 2000, the
work rate was reduced to zero in over half the states. Id. Only about a dozen states had an
adjusted work rate above 10 percent. Id. Despite these reduced requirements, states actu-
ally achieved higher work rates, an average of 34 percent nationally. Id. (For FY 2000,
the rate states were required to meet was set at 40 percent.) Id. All states have met their
adjusted rates, and most have achieved well above their adjusted work rates. Id.
10 See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 42.  “Workfare” is unpaid work which welfare recipients
are required to perform in exchange for receiving benefits.  Since workfare, but generally
not training or other work-preparation activities, would have counted as primary work
activities under the House Bill, and as workfare is less costly than providing subsidized
employment, states could be driven towards massive use of workfare for those recipients
who have not found unsubsidized employment. Id. While conservatives advocate increased
use of workfare, little in the research supports the notion that it leads to increases in
unsubsidized private employment or that recipients learn new skills. Id.
11 Robert Rector, Implementing Welfare Reform and Restoring Marriage, in PRIORITIES
FOR THE PRESIDENT ch. 4, 8 (Stuart M. Butler & Kim R. Holmes eds., 2001), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/mandate/priorities. CFM.
12 Testimony of Robert Rector, Heritage Foundation, before the Subcommittee on
Human Resources of the House Committee on Ways and Means (Mar. 15, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/Test031501b.cfm; see also Rector,
supra note 11.
13 Testimony of Robert Rector, supra note 12; see also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK,
FIGHTING BACK 19 (2000) (discussion of ideological arguments).
14 Rector, supra note 11, at 17.
15 Abramovitz, supra note 13, at 21.
16 Mark Greenberg, Bush’s Blunder, 13 AM. PROSPECT 13, July 15, 2002 (Online), at
http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/13/greenberg-m.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2002)
(on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
17 Rector, supra note 11, at 3.
18 Rector, supra note 11, at 9.  Rector discusses this tension in a discussion of divergent
approaches among conservatives, discussing the “procedural” approach of limiting
or abolishing welfare programs versus the “behavioral content” approach (which he
advocates) of addressing issues of work ethic, illegitimacy, and other behavior. Id.
19 Greenberg Interview, supra note 1.
20 Greenberg, supra note 16.
21 Id.
22 Robert Pear, Study by Governor Calls Bush Welfare Plan Unworkable, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002.  See also NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & AM. PUB. HUMAN SERV. ASS’N,
TANF REAUTHORIZATION
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WELFARE REFORM REAUTHORIZATION: STATE IMPACT OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN WORK REQUIRE-
MENTS, APRIL 2002 SURVEY RESULTS (2002), available at http://www.aphsa.org/reauthor/
ngaaphsasurvey.asp.
23 Mary Leonard, Bush Seeks Strict Rules on Welfare, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 2002, at
A1; Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Sharply Criticizes Senate Version of Welfare Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2002.
